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Abstract
To see the variance of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, we ran an experi-
ment described by the following steps. First, we calibrate several models with heteroge-
neous agents and generate aggregate time series data. Then, we estimate the elasticity
in the New Keynesian Model using the data from former models. Finally, we check and
compare the estimated parameters. Our main finding is that there is some possiblity of
misestimating the parameter due to the differences of fiscal policy regimes and heteroge-
neous agents.
1 Introduction
One of the main advantages of modern DSGE models is that the models have so-called deep
parameters which are thought to be invariant against policy change, and because of the
stability of these parameters, economists could evaluate economic policy. In other words,
when we evaluate an economic policy using the DSGE model, we implicitly assume that the
model does not have to be subject to the critique of Lucas (1976).
However, several studies indicate the instability of deep parameters. Fernandez-Villaverde,
Rubin-Ramirez, Conley, and Schorfheide (2007) estimated a DSGE model which allowed
for parameters drifting. They found evidence that deep parameters changed in response to
monetary policy within the sample periods in the U.S. Furthermore, they showed that the
movements in the pricing parameters are correlated with inflation.
Similarly, Inoue and Rossi (2008) investigated the instability of structural parameters
within the DSGE and VARs models, and they found that such instabilities are not only a
concern for the monetary policy function but also for the IS equation and Euler equation.
Conley and Yagihashi (2010) generated simulated data using a model with state-dependent
pricing, and then used the data to estimate a model with time-dependent pricing. They
found that the private-sector parameters are unstable against the monetary policy.
Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2013) also ran an experiment similar to Conley and Yag-
ihashi (2010). First, they simulated a model with heterogeneous agents and generated the
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aggregate time series data. After that, they estimated a representative agent model using the
data from the heterogeneous agents economy and found that several important parameters,
especially the labor supply elasticity, are not invariant against the fiscal policy change.
This paper aims to examine the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption
(which is one of the most important preference parameters for fiscal policy because it formu-
lates the shape of the Euler equation) to determine if it is policy variant or not, and if so, to
understand what kind of fiscal policy we could evaluate using the New Keynesian Model.
To do that, we ran an experiment similar to Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2013) and
checked the variance of the parameter. As pointed out in the empirical study of Inoue and
Rossi (2008) empirical study, the parameters of the Euler equation are not stable in the post-
war U.S. However, we do not know the theoretical reason of the instability. Different from
Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2013), we reduced the differences between the data-generating
model and the estimation model, and tried to simplify those models as much as possible. In
this way, we could identify the misestimation that comes from the imperfect aggregation
of households. Our experiment is described by the following steps: Calibrate and simulate
several heterogeneous agent models whose differences are types of redistributive regimes.
We use four types of regimes in our experiment, so we run four true models for data gen-
eration. Then, we gain the time series data of aggregate production, consumption, capital
stock, and productivity, according to the four regimes. Using the data from the heteroge-
neous agents economy, estimate the elasticity of the intertemporal substitution of the New
Keynesian Model. Compare the estimated values between the policy regimes. If the value is
different from that of another economy, the parameter is misestimated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the data-generating
model with heterogeneous agents that feature an incomplete capital market and the agents’
motive for precautionary saving. After that, we calibrate the economy and obtain the aggre-
gate time series data. In section 3, I describe the estimation model, which features rational
and nonrational agents and a complete capital market. In section 4, we estimate the estima-
tion model using data generated from the preceding model and check the policy variance of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Section 5 concludes with some suggestions for
future work.
2 The Data Generating Model
The model is a version of the stochastic-growth model with heterogeneous agents. In the
economy, there is a large (measure one) population of finitely lived agents whose preferences
and ex-ante wealth levels are identical. They maximize their intertemporal utility1.
1Krusell and Smith(2006) and Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante(2009) survey the model with heteroge-
neous agents. Ljungqvist and Sargent(2012), Guvenen(2009), and Heer and Maussner(2009) describe the model
in detail.
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2.1 Model Specification
Households.
The model is a version of the stochastic-growth model with heterogeneous agents. In the
economy, there is a large (measure one) population of finitely lived agents whose preferences
and ex-ante wealth levels are identical. They maximize their intertemporal utility
E0
•
Â
t=0
btu(ct) (2.1)
with
u(ct) =
c1 qt
1  q . (2.2)
where ct is their consumption and q denotes the coefficient of relative risk-aversion which
is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. Households
could be employed or unemployed. If the agent is employed, he earns wage wt, while if
unemployed, he receives unemployment compensation bt from the government. Then, the
household’s budget constraint is described as
at+1 =
8<:(1+ (1  tK)rt)at + (1  tL)wt   ct, i f et = e,(1+ (1  tK)rt)at + bt   ct, i f et = u, (2.3)
where at is his asset level which yields the real interest rate rt . The income from the real
interest and wage are taxed at fixed rates tK and tL. The idiosyncratic labor risks et (e =
employd, u = unemployed) vary exogeneously, following a first order Markov process with
the transition matrix
p(e0 | e) = p  et+1 = e0 | et = e =  puu puepeu pee
!
, (2.4)
Additionally, we assume that at+1   amin where amin is the natural borrowing limit introduced
by Aiyagari(1994).
Firms.
There is only one good per period, and production Yt is determined by the Cobb-Douglas
function of capital input Kt and labor input Lt and the aggregate productivityZt: Yt =
ZtL1 at Ka. We assume that Zt could take only two values Zg and Zb whose probability fol-
lows a first order Markov process
p(Z0|Z) = p  Zt+1 = Z0|Zt = Z =  pZgZg pZgZbpZbZg pZbZb
!
. (2.5)
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In a market equilibrium, the factor prices satisfy the first order conditions of the firm
wt = Zt(1  a)
✓
Kt
Lt
◆a
, (2.6)
rt = Zta
✓
Nt
Lt
◆1 a
  d. (2.7)
Government.
Redistributive fiscal policies are characterized by labor tax rates tL, capital tax rates tK, and
the level of lump-sum transfersbt. The revenue of the government Tt is
Tt = tLwtLt + tKrtKt, (2.8)
and the total amount of transfers Bt is
Bt =
ˆ
bt ft(ut, at)dat, (2.9)
and balanced government budget
Tt = Bt. (2.10)
Market Clearing Conditions.
The sum of households’ asset and consumption are equal to aggregate capital and consump-
tion
Kt = Â
et2{e,u}
ˆ
at ft(et, at)dat, (2.11)
Ct = Â
et2{e.u}
ˆ
ct ft(et, at)dat, (2.12)
and the sum of employed households’ equal to aggregate labor supply
Lt =
ˆ
ft(et, at)dat, (2.13)
where ft is the density function associated with the distribution function Ft.
Dynamics of the Distribution.
From (2.4) and (2.5), the employment transition probability follows
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G(Z0, e0|Z, e) = p  Zt+1 = Z0, et+1 = e0|Zt = Z, et = e =
0BBBB@
pZgeZge pZgeZgu pZgeZbe pZgeZbu
pZguZge pZguZgu pZguZbe pZguZbu
pZbeZge pZbeZgu pZbeZbe pZbeZbu
pZbuZbe pZbuZgu pZbuZbe pZbuZbu
1CCCCA ,
(2.14)
and then, the dynamics of the distribution are described by
Ft+1(et+1, at+1;Zt+1,Kt+1) = Â
et2{e,u}
G(Zt+1et+1 | Zt, et)Ft(et, at;Zt,Kt). (2.15)
Approximate Aggregation.
From (2.1) to (2.15), we could formulate the recursive problem. The households maximize
their value function
V(e, a,Z, F) = maxc,a0 [u(c) + bE {V(e0, a0,Z0, F0|e,Z, F}] , (2.16)
subject to the budget constraint (2.4), the employment transition probability (2.14), and the
dynamics of the distribution (2.15). However, we could not solve this problem because the
distribution F and the employment transition probability G are high-dimensional object, and
it is well known that finding a numerical solution for dynamic programming problems be-
comes increasingly difficult as the size of the state space increases. To solve the problem,
we follow Krusell and Smith(1998) and assumed that agents are boundedly rational2. We
suppose that agents perceive current or future distribution depending on only I moments of
G. Then, the law of motion for I ’s moments m
m0 = HI(m) (2.17)
where HI is a dynamics of I’s moments m. We rather follow Krusell and Smith(1998), and
assume (2.17) is a log linear law of motion
lnK0 = g0 + g1lnK. (2.18)
To simplify the dynamics of aggregate employment, we also assume that the transition ma-
trix Gis restricted
uz
pZuZ0u
pZZ0
+ (1  uzZ) pZeZ0upZZ0 = uz
0 (2.19)
for Z,Z0 2  Zg,Zb . The condition (2.19) implies that we do not have to consider employ-
ment L as a state variable. Then, the value function (2.16) could be rewrite as
2There are other methods to solve the problem. For example, Algan, Yann, and Den Haan(2008) and Re-
iter(2009).
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V(e, a,Z,m) = maxc,a0 [u(c) + bE {V(e0, a0,Z0,m0|e,Z,m}] . (2.20)
Now we could solve the problem (2.20) using numerical methods.
2.2 Calibration
TABLE 1. HOUSEHOLDS’ PARAMETERS
a Labor share 0.36
b Discount rate 0.96
d Capital depreciate rate 0.10
q Coefficient of relative risk aversion 1.50
We now specify the parameter values of the heterogeneous agents economy. The param-
eters are selected on the basis of empirical and theoretical knowledge, and the models used
to generate quantitative statements. Table 1. illustrate the calibrated parameter values. The
parameters are selected for a model period equal to one year. The preference parameters
a,b,d,q are consistent with postwar U.S. which taken from Castaneda, Dıaz-Giménez, and
Rıos-Rull(1998). We assume that the natural borrowing limit amin =  2.00, and the aggre-
gate productivity takes only two values zg = 1.10 and Zb = 0.90, and the average duration
of a boom and recession are 5 years. Then, the transition matrix of Z (2.5) is equal to
p(Z0|Z) = prob  Zt+1 = Z0|Zt = Z =  0.80 0.200.20 0.80
!
. (2.21)
The conditional employment probabilities are also taken from Castaneda, Dıaz-Giménez,
and Rıos-Rull(1998)
p(e0 | e, Z0 = Zg, Z = Zg) = p
 
et+1 = e
0 | et = e
 
=
 
0.9615 0.0385
0.9581 0.0492
!
, (2.22)
p(e0 | e, Z0 = Zb, Z = Zb) = p
 
et+1 = e
0 | et = e
 
=
 
0.9625 0.0475
0.3952 0.6048
!
, (2.23)
then, ug = 3.86% and ub = 10.73%. The conditional employment probabilities for the transi-
tion from good to bad p(e0|e, Z0 = Zg, Z = Zb) and bad to good p(e0|e, Z0 = Zb, Z = Zg)
are calibrated using the condition (2.19). Finally, we set the redistributive fiscal policy pa-
rameters. Following Chang, Kim Schorfheide(2013), we set the benchmark tax rates as the
same as the ones in the U.S. in 2004. Table 2. illustrates the value of fiscal policy regimes.
We calibrate and simulate four kinds of redgimes, which differ in the value of tax rates, and
generate four kinds of aggregate time series data.
TABLE 2. POLICY PARAMETERS
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Benchmark Labor tax cut Capital tax cut No tax
tL 0.269 0.000 0.000
tK 0.327 0.000 0.000
2.3 Algorithm
We compute the dynamics of the heterogeneous agents model using the algorithm below.3.
1. Compute aggregate employment N0 as a function of Z.
2. Choose F0(K0), I, and initial parameters of HI .
3. Compute v(e, a,Z,m) using the value function iteration method and endogenous grid-
points method.
4. Simulate the dynamics of the distribution.
5. Estimate the law of motion for m using the path of the distribution.
6. Iterate until the parameters of HI converge.
7. Test the goodness of fit for HI , if fit is satisfactory, stop. Otherwise change the form of
HI or choose another moments.
3 The Estimation Model
The Estimation model is almost the same as the previous model except for the abstracted
households’ heterogeneity. We followed Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007) and added the
simple Neoclassical GrowthModel to the rule-of-thumb agents who spent all of their income
in every period. In other words, they have a Keynesian Consumption Function. Therefore,
it could be said that Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007) included both the Neoclassical
style rational households and the Keynesian style nonrational households. Recently, this
assumption has often been used for themodel for fiscal policy evaluation, because if there are
only rational agents, there is no impact on the fiscal policy due to the Ricardian Equivalence
Theorem.
3.1 Model Specification
In the economy, there are two types of agents: one is the rational agent, and the other is a
rule of thumb agent who consumes all of their income. The government has an incentive to
use the redistributive policy because its could be increase yt. The rule-of-thumb agent got a
lump-sum transfer from the government and they spend it all in time t
c
0
t = Bt (3.1)
3For more detail, see Krusell and Smith(1998), Heer and Maussner(2009) for coumptation of the heteroge-
neous agent model, Miranda, Mario and Fackler(2002), Judd(1991) for the value function iteration method and
the endogenous gridpoints method.
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where c0t denotes the rule-of-thumb agent’s consumption. Different from the heteroge-
neous agents economy, agents do not face idiosyncratic earning shocks, so neither agents
has precautionary saving motives.
The aggregate consumption Ct is given by
Ct = wct + (1 w)c0t (3.2)
where w is a portion of agents and w 2 [0, 1]. The rational agent save and consume with his
budget constraint
Kt+1 = (1+ (1  tK)rt)Kt + (1  tL)wt   ct. (3.3)
Because the rule-of-thumb agent never save, the rational agent’s asset level is the same as
the aggregate capital stock.
Other parts of the economy are the same as the last one. The CRRA utility function
E0
•
Â
t=0
bt
c1 qt
1  q , (3.4)
the factor prices satisfies the first order conditions of the firm,
wt = Zt(1  a)
✓
Kt
Nt
◆a
, (3.5)
rt = Zta
✓
Nt
Kt
◆1 a
  d, (3.6)
the government budget constraint
Tt = tLwtLt + tKrtKt, (3.7)
and balanced government budget
Bt = Tt. (3.8)
3.2 Econometric Analysis
We now estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the estimation model us-
ing the Bayesian techniques. We assume that the estimatian knows the true value of some
parameters(a,b,d) and tax rates (tK, tK) when estimating the model. Table 3. shows the prior
density, prior mean and standard deviation of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We
use the true value of q as prior mean, and the prior density and the standard deviation are
followed Sugo and Ueda(2008).
TABLE 3. PRIOR DISTRIBUTION
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Density Mean S.D.
q Gamma 1.50 0.50
4 Estimation Results
TABLE 4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Benchmark Labor tax cut Capital tax cut No tax
Posterior mean 1.3118 1.3145 1.4248 1.4263
90% Intv. [0.7966, 2.0224] [0.8560,1.9276] [0.7274,2.1264] [0.7212, 2.1316]
Table 4. show the results of the estimation. The calibrated parameter of data-generating
model q = 1.50 is the true value for the estimation model because if the estimation model is
perfectly same as the data-generating model, the parameter values coincidewith each other
except for the estimation error.
Although all 90 percentile intervals include the true value j =1.50, the results show little
policy variance of the parameter. The parameter is largest in the economy with No Tax,
whose wealth inequality level is largest in the true model. On the other hand, the benchmark
economy, which is the most redistributive regime, was estimated to have the smallest value
of the parameter. Therefore, the results suggest that if the regime in the true economy is
redistributive, the parameter estimated is much less than the real value, and vice versa.
One of the possible explanations of this fact is that if the government will increase the
transfers, the poor households will consume much more, so the aggregate consumption will
increase and the aggregate capital stock will decrease. For an estimatian who estimates using
the NewKeynesianModel, the change of variables are thought to be due to the rational agent
beginning to prefer consuming rather than saving, that is, she preferred to consume today
rather than tomorrow. That means the intertemporal elasticity of substitution will increase,
and the coefficient of relative risk aversion q will decrease.
The results also suggest that the estimated values are smaller than the true value due
to the absence of the precautionary saving motive. In the true economy, households save
against the idiosyncratic earning shocks. Therefore, they save more than the rational agent,
who only saves to maximize their intertemporal utility. Therefore, an agent with no uncer-
tainty prefers to consume today rather than agents who face idiosyncratic shocks, if other
circumstances are the same. When an estimatian estimates, he indirectly assumes that the
observable data are from the agent’s rational behavior, so if the aggregate consumption in-
creases, it is thought there will be a decrease of the elasticity of substitution in consumption.
However, in our experiments, we fixed the value of the elasticity of substitution and only
changed the redistributive regimes. The policy differences vary the aggregate consumption
levels, and the estimatian thought the differences were coming from the elasticity of substi-
tution. These misestimations are attributed to the lack of households’ precautionary saving
motives in the estimation model.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the possibility of misestimation of the elasticity of substitution due
to the abstracted households. The quantitative results suggest that the parameter could be
seen differently according to the differences in the redistributive policy regimes, even if the
true parameter value is the same. This is because of the differences between the two models:
whether agents face the idiosyncratic income shock or not. In other words, the results imply
we should care not only about the presence of non-rational households but also about the
precautionary saving motives. Furthermore, the results also suggest that such estimation is
larger when the regime is redistributive. However, we only experimented with the simplest
model, so much remains to be done. For one thing, we do not consider the labor supply
elasticity whose instability is indicated in Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2013). Furthermore,
we make a strong assumption that the rule-of-thumb agent is unemployed. In addition to
that, we suppose that the ratio of the two agents is given exogenously. As we denoted,
these assumptions are made to simplify the model, and our main findings are not denied by
these assumptions because the base of the New Keynesian Model is similar to our estima-
tion model, so the possibility of misestimation remains even if the model is more complex.
Of course, I do not mean to criticize the quantitative DSGE models, just trying to find out
the individual roles of the models. These kinds of studies contribute to the fields of model
selection and make the future policy evaluation more accurate.
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